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| REMEMBER FALLUJAH: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE OCCUPATION A briefing by Milan Rai of Justice Not Vengeance, 7 Oct 2005 This is the story of Fallujah, and how it became so famous and so dangerous; how it became a ruined city. It is also the story of how the United States—and Britain—became the problem in Iraq, not the solution. In April 2004, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said, ‘[I]t was not the Americans who cast the first stone, either in Fallujah nor in the areas where they came under attack.’ This is a lie. THE
FIRST MASSACRES The troops were probably responding to the sound of guns being fired in the air nearby to celebrate Saddam Hussein’s birthday. British journalist Phil Reeves concluded that the soldiers were not fired on: ‘There are no bullet marks on the facade of the school or the perimeter wall in front of it.’ (Independent on Sunday, 4 May 2003, p. 17) Despite this unprovoked atrocity, Fallujah continued to protest nonviolently. Another unarmed demonstration followed two days later. At the demo, reporters from the Daily Mirror saw a young boy hurl a sandal at a US jeep. A soldier in the jeep, perhaps mistaking it for a grenade, unleashed a 20-second burst of his machine gun at ‘a crowd of 1,000 unarmed people’. Two people were killed. Reporter Chris Hughes said, ‘We heard no warning to disperse and saw no guns or knives among the Iraqis whose religious and tribal leaders kept shouting through loudhailers to remain peaceful.’ After the shooting, those in the crowd still standing—‘now apparently insane with anger—ran at the fortress battering its walls with their fists. Many had tears pouring down their faces.’ (Daily Mirror, 1 May 2003, p. 4) TURNING
TO REVENGE The people of Fallujah, a city of 300,000, turned decisively to violence. Sheikh Jamil Ibrahim Mohammed said, ‘What can you do if a man sees American troops kill his son, and then you see these same men on our streets every day? Of course he will seek revenge, especially if he sees there is no justice from the Americans.’ (Times, 12 June 2003, p. 16) ‘Everyone here was happy at first that the Americans threw out Saddam,’ Ibrahim Hamad, a retired soldier, said. ‘But these killings will make all our children go off with bin Laden.’ (Reuters, 1 May 2003) IMPUNITY These rules of engagement have been applied throughout the US zone of occupation. The resulting civilian deaths have fuelled and expanded the insurgency. This is how Fallujah and the wider ‘Sunni triangle’ became a hotbed of insurgency. THE
ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY ERASED
FROM HISTORY INVASION
MARK 1 - APRIL 2004 Five days earlier, US marines had swept through Fallujah killing ‘at least six Iraqi civilians, including an 11-year-old boy, and a television cameraman’. (Observer, 28 March 2004 <tinyurl.com/btaaz>) Could this have contributed to the crowd’s hatred? The media did not ask. At least one US battalion had ‘orders to shoot any male of military age on the streets after dark, armed or not’. One US soldier told the New York Times ‘he had seen an American helicopter fire a missile at a man with a slingshot. “Crazy huh?” ’ (NYT, 14 April 2004 <tinyurl.com/dssy8>). According to the local hospital director, 731 civilians were killed by US forces in Fallujah. <tinyurl.com/b8b2e> The invasion was halted by protests inside and outside Iraq, partly because of the loss of civilian life. INVASION
MARK 2 - NOVEMBER 2004 US forces announced before the bombardment that men under the age of 45 trying to leave the city would be arrested. (Sunday Telegraph, 7 Nov. 2004 <tinyurl.com/bpfcf> It was estimated that around 60,000 civilians but only between ‘600 to 6,000’ fighters remained in Fallujah before the assault. It was reported that ‘Anyone still in the city will be regarded as a potential insurgent.’ (Observer, 7 Nov. 2004 <tinyurl.com/af53d>) Dr Rafa’ah al-Iyssaue, director of the main hospital in Fallujah reported to the UN after the invasion that more than 700 bodies had been recovered from the rubble in 9 out of the city’s 27 neighbourhoods. 550 were women and children. <tinyurl.com/8vrdv> THE
PRETEXT True, the insurgents had their own conditions, ‘which included a halt to U.S. attacks on the city and acknowledgment by the military that women and children have been among the casualties in U.S. strikes.’ (Washington Post, 28 Oct., <tinyurl.com/47axh>) But this might have achieved the bloodless exclusion of ‘foreign fighters’ and heavy weapons from the city, if this was indeed the purpose of the invasion. The offer was rejected out of hand. A (mainly Sunni) coalition proposed ‘a plan to establish the rule of law in those areas through peaceful means’ on the basis of six measures, ‘including a demand that U.S. forces remain confined to bases in the month before balloting’ for the January elections. An official involved in establishing the transitional government said this was ‘very significant... If you look at their demands, they’re not impossible. They are things that can be discussed.’ Larry Diamond, who served in the US-led occupation authority, said, ‘If there’s a chance that this could be the beginning of political transformation that could change he situation on the ground, I think we’ve got to take it.” (WP, 6 Nov. 2004 <tinyurl.com/6p69o>) These proposals might not have worked. They were not tried. SADDAM'S
PATH CONCLUSION |
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